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Combining Conventional Cryptography with
Information Theoretic Security
Jason Castiglione
Abstract—This paper highlights security issues that can arise
when incorrect assumptions are made on the capabilities of an
eavesdropper. In particular, we analyze a channel model based
on a split Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). Corresponding
security parameters are chosen based on this channel model,
and assumptions on the eavesdroppers capabilities. A gradual
relaxation of the restrictions on the eavesdropper’s capabilities
will be made, and the resulting loss of security will be quantified.
An alternative will then be presented that is based on stochastic
encoding and creating artificially noisy channels through the
usage of private keys. The artificial channel will be constructed
through a deterministic process that will be computationally
intractable to reverse.
I. INTRODUCTION
A PATH to securing communications through the use ofinformation theoretic notions was started by Shannon
in the 1940’s. In his papers he related fundamental notions,
such as entropy, to the secrecy of cryptographic systems
[1]. Inspired by the work of Shannon, Wyner published a
paper proving that it was theoretically possible to secure
communications solely through the choice of an encoding
scheme for a specific channel model [2]. Wyner’s security
model capitalizes on the eavesdropper receiving a noisier copy
of what the intended user receives.
In general, for communications security, assumptions on the
capabilities of eavesdroppers are required to design systems.
In Wyner’s paper, the presumption is on the channel noise
of the eavesdropper. On the other hand, in contemporary
cryptography it is assumed that the eavesdropper is subject
to certain computational limitations. It is accepted that many
people have attempted to break a cryptosystem, and their best
efforts to recover plaintext require an infeasible amount of
time. In particular, the computational complexity of factoring
products of primes is unknown, although it is widely accepted
to be a hard problem. Thus the only guarantee of the security
of these systems is that numerous people have attempted to
attack the system and have not succeeded.
The question for physical layer security is what circum-
stances will allow similar conclusions about the eavesdropper’s
capabilities as in cryptography. In physical layer security,
channel noise combined with a special encoder provide the
security. Thus for Wyner’s method, how can one ensure that
the eavesdropper’s channel has specific noise characteristics,
thus limiting his/her decoding capabilities?
The goal in this paper is to work with a well-studied channel
model, and gradually relax restrictions on the eavesdropper’s
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capabilities. As these relaxations are made, the effect on the
security of the system will be evaluated. We will show that if
the real channel characteristics deviate even slightly from the
assumptions, all guarantees of security are lost.
Since in a practical system, no assumptions (either on the
intended user’s or the eavesdropper’s channel) are verifiable,
we can not claim 100% security. The intended users rarely
have control over the eavesdropper’s access (especially in the
wireless setting) or the eavesdropper’s behavior, so basing a
security system on questionable assumptions is risky. On the
other hand, Wyner’s basic idea can be easily combined with
cryptographic methods to achieve a secure system based on
computationally intractable problems. For example, we can
artificially create a channel that is information-theoretically
secure under the assumption that the shared key can not be
recovered, i.e., the recovery of the key is computationally
intractable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the channel
model is presented. The general results for wiretap coding
and achieving secrecy are discussed in Section III. Section IV
quantifies the amount of secrecy lost when the eavesdropper
has better access than anticipated. In Section V, a shared
key cryptosystem is presented from Mihaljevic [3], that sets
the path for a more general method of combining stochastic
encoding with computationally intractable problems.
The notation for this paper is as follows. Random variables
will be represented by uppercase letters (S,X, Y, Z), and
their instances by lower case letters (s, x, y, z). Caligraphic
uppercase letters will represent the domain of the correspond-
ing random variable (S,X ,Y,Z). Since we will consider a
sequence of codes, CM , we will use a M subscript to denote
the corresponding parameters, i.e., CM will have rate KMNM .
II. CHANNEL MODEL
The communication model used for this paper is a broadcast
channel with confidential messages (BCC) [4], and depicted in
Fig. 1. In general, the BCC model has confidential messages
and public messages. The BCC model is a generalization
of the Wyner wiretap model. In this paper, there will only
be confidential messages. The model in this paper consists
of a memoryless concatenated additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel followed by a 2-level and L-level analog to
digital (A/D) converters on the main and wiretap channels,
respectively.
Definition 1. (Stochastic encoder) A stochastic encoder, fE ,
with rate K
N
, input SK , and output XN , is a channel with
transition probability f(xN |sK), that satisfies;
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Fig. 1. Channel Model
1) ∑xN f(xN |sK) = 1, for any sK ∈ SK
2) If f(xN |sK) > 0 and tK 6= sK , then f(xN |tK) = 0
The input to the stochastic encoder is a uniform random
variable, SK ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2K}, which is the source message,
and has entropy
H(SK) = K ·H(S) = K.
The stochastic encoder, with rate K
N
, outputs XN ∈ XN .
For our channel model, we let XN = {−1, 1}N . In this
model there is a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. The
legitimate user receives Y N . When L = 2, the eavesdropper
receives ZN . To distinguish the case when L > 2, we will
say that the eavesdropper receives ZˆN . There is independent
AWGN noise in both the main and wiretap channel. We
assume that the eavesdropper has a noise variance greater
than that of the legitimate receiver. When just considering the
input and output, the channels are both discrete memoryless
channels (DMC).
The legitimate channel users will construct a security system
based on the assumption that the eavesdropper is restricted to a
two-level A/D converter, and σ2W > 0. The goal in this paper
is to quantify the effect of making an incorrect assumption
about L, and suggest an improvement through the use of a
shared key based cryptosystem.
In the case L = 2, it follows that the main and eavesdropper
channels can be individually modeled as binary symmetric
channels, BSC(p), and BSC(pW ) respectively. The corre-
sponding crossover probabilities are p = Φ(−1/
√
σ2M ), and
pW = Φ(−1/
√
σ2M + σ
2
W ) where Φ is the CDF for the
normal distribution. Since σ2W > 0, it follows that 0 ≤ p <
pW < 1/2. This means that the capacity of the wiretap channel
is lower than the capacity of the main channel.
Definition 2. (Stochastically degraded channel) The channel,
(X, pZ|X , Z) , is said to be stochastically degraded with
respect to the channel, (X, pY |X , Y ), if there exists a channel,
(Y, pZ|Y , Z), such that for every (x, z) ∈ X × Z,
pZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X(y|x) (1)
First note, the concatenation of BSC(p) and BSC(pY )
channels is a BSC(pW ) channel, where pW = p(1 − pY ) +
(1 − p)pY . Thus with regards to conditional probabilities,
the concatenated and split BSCs are equivalent, see Fig. 2.
It follows that the wiretap channel is stochastically degraded
with respect to the main channel [6]. This is important since
the results in Wyner’s wiretap paper pertain strictly to con-
catenated channels, yet they are extendable to split channels
under these conditions.
BSC(p)
BSC(pY)
Is equivalent to 
BSC(pW)
BSC(p)
Fig. 2. Equivalence with regards to conditional probability
III. SECRECY CAPACITY
It is clear that we have a channel model where the eaves-
dropper is worse off than the intended receiver. Now the
question is how the additional uncertainty in the eavesdrop-
per’s channel leads to secrecy. To quantify the ability to send
confidential messages over a broadcast channel, we define
first a measure of uncertainty that the eavesdropper has with
regards to the original message.
Definition 3. (Equivocation) The equivocation of the eaves-
dropper is defined as
∆ ,
H(SK |ZN )
K
(2)
In the event H(SK |ZN) = H(SK) = K , i.e., ZN provides
no information about the original source, the eavesdropper’s
only available method is to guess according to the distribution
of the source message. In designing a code, the objective is to
achieve security through maximizing the equivocation. That is
if H(SK |ZN ) = H(SK), then the system is secure.
Definition 4. (Wiretap Code) A wiretap (2K , N) code, CN ,
for a BCC consists of
• Message set, SK = {1, 2, . . . , 2K}
• Stochastic encoder, fE : SK → XN
• Decoder, g : YN → SK
Secrecy in these systems is introduced through the use of
the stochastic encoder. The encoder will map one message to
different outputs such that when the eavesdropper has enough
error, any attempt to decode will result in a random message.
Example 1. Assume that the main channel is noiseless,
and the wiretap channel is a BSC(0.25). Let SK =
{1, 2}, H(SK) = 1. Define the stochastic encoder as follows,
1 7→ (−1,−1) or (1, 1) with equal probability
2 7→ (1,−1) or (−1, 1) with equal probability
We can calculate the equivocation of this simple coding
scheme, which results in
H(S|Z2) =− [((1− pW )2 + p2W ) ∗ log ((1− pW )2 + p2W )
(3)
+ (2(1− pW )pW ) ∗ log (2(1− pW )pW )] (4)
≈0.954 (5)
Observe in the case we transmit the message without any en-
coding over the channel, the eavesdropper will have equivoca-
tion h(pW ) ≈ 0.81. Thus we have increased the equivocation
3of the eavesdropper using a wiretap (2, 2) code. Increasing
equivocation through a random one-to-many mapping is the
notion behind using a stochastic encoder for security.
A. Achievability
In the above example, we presented a rate 12 stochastic
encoder that increased the eavesdropper’s equivocation. The
question remains as to what are the limits with regards to
possible rates, and equivocation. First we define requirements
for a rate-equivocation pair to be achievable.
Definition 5. (Achievability) A rate-equivocation pair, (R, d),
is achievable if there exists a series of wiretap (2KM , NM )
codes, {CM}M≥1 such that
1) limM→∞ H(S)·KMNM = R (Rate)
2) limM→∞ Pe(CM ) = 0 (Probability of Error)
3) limM→∞ H(S
KM |ZNM )
KM
≥ d (Equivocation)
The second achievability condition assures that the legit-
imate user will be able to decode the confidential message.
The third achievability condition is called weak secrecy, and
puts a lower bound on the wiretapper’s equivocation. Now we
have the framework to define the secrecy capacity.
Definition 6. (Secrecy Capacity) The secrecy capacity of a
BCC with no common message is
CS , sup
R
{R : (R,H(S)) is achievable} (6)
Thus CS is the maximum rate at which error free com-
munication is possible over the main channel, with maximum
equivocation over the wiretap channel. Furthermore the region
of achievable rates is characterized by the following general-
ization of the Wyner’s results.
Theorem III.1. (Region of Achievability)(Korner and Csiszar
[4]) Given a BCC with no common message the region,
R1e ,
{
(R,
R · d
H(S)
)|(R, d) is achievable
}
is a closed convex set for which there exist random variables,
U and V , such that U → V → X → Y and U → V →
X → Z are Markov chains. Furthermore, the conditional
distribution of Y (respectively Z) given X characterizes the
main (respectively wiretap) channel and
1) 0 ≤ d ≤ H(S)
2) R · d ≤ H(S) · [I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)]
3) R ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)]
In particular,
CS = max
(V →X→YV →X→Z)
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (7)
Since the wiretap channel is stochastically degraded with
respect to the main channel, [4] and [5] give us that for our
channel model, the following corollary holds.
Corollary III.2. (Achievability for Stochastically Degraded
Channels)(Korner and Csiszar [4]) If the wiretap channel is
stochastically degraded with respect to the main channel, then
the above region, R1e, simplifies to those pairs (R, R·dH(S) ) such
that
1) 0 ≤ R · d ≤ H(S) · [I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]
2) 0 ≤ d ≤ H(S)
3) 0 ≤ R ≤ I(X ;Y )
In particular,
CS = max
pX
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] (8)
where the maximization is over probability distributions, pX ,
on X .
Thus for our channel model, in the case L = 2, it follows,
CS = max
pX
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] (9)
= max
pX
[H(Y )−H(Y |X)−H(Z) +H(Z|X)] (10)
= max
pX
[H(pW )−H(p) +H(Y )−H(Z)] (11)
≤ H(pW )−H(p) (12)
Observe Eq. (12) follows because a BSC does not decrease
entropy, i.e., H(Y ) ≤ H(Z). Furthermore note for X uniform,
H(Y ) = H(Z), thus
CS = H(pW )−H(p).
This means that if the legitimate users believe that the
eavesdropper has a A/D(2) converter, they will also believe
that they can securely transmit over the main channel at
h(pW )− h(p) bit per channel use. Thereby under this belief,
the eavesdropper will not be able to do better than random
guessing of the source message.
B. Code Parameters
From this point, since (CS , 1) is achievable, we will con-
struct a sequence of random linear codes as specified in [6].
Let {ǫM}M≥1 be a sequence of positive numbers ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . ,
such that ǫM < 1/M . Then for each ǫM , we can choose
NM large enough such that there exists a wiretap code, CM ,
satisfying;
1) KM
NM
≥ h(pW )− h(p)− ǫM
2) H(SKM |ZNM )
KM
≥ 1− ǫM
3) Pe(CM ) ≤ ǫM
Note, each CM is specified by a binary (NM − KM,2) ×
(NM ) matrix, HM,2, with the following parameters;
KM,2 = ⌊NM [1− h(p)− 2ǫM ]⌋ (13)
KM,1 = ⌊NM [1− h(pW )− 2ǫM ]⌋ (14)
KM = KM,1 −KM,2 (15)
Then to encode a source message, sKM , we randomly choose
a solution xNM of the equation,
xNMHTM,2 = [0 sKM ] (16)
as the encoded message. To decode, a typical set decoder is
used. In practice, this is not a realistic decoding scheme, but
will suffice in this paper to allow us to calculate effects on
equivocation. Han Vinck and Chen [6] have an elegant proof
that this coding method will suffice and achieves (CS , 1).
4IV. SOFT DECODING
The rate-equivocation pair (CS , 1) is achievable, and we
have an associated sequence of wiretap codes, {CM}M≥1.
We will now relax the restriction on the A/D(L) converter
to analyze the effect on equivocation. Our goal will be to look
at the effects of increasing L on the equivocation.
The equivocation loss is defined as the difference between
the believed equivocation, and the actual equivocation. In other
words, the equivocation loss is the amount of information (in
bits per channel use) that is leaked to the eavesdropper as a
result of a false belief (wrong assumption) by the legitimate
users. In particular, we are interested in the asymptotic value
of the equivocation loss,
H(SK |ZN )−H(SK |ZˆN)
K
(17)
as L→∞, where Zˆ is dependent on L. Since we are unaware
of the capabilities of the eavesdropper, our assumption will be
that arbitrarily level A/D converters are available.
Theorem IV.1. (Equivocation Loss)
lim
M→∞
H(SKM |ZNM )−H(SKM |ZˆNM )
KM
=
h(pW )− 1 + I(X ; Zˆ)
h(pW )− h(p)
Proof. This proof uses the analysis of the BSC-BSC wiretap
channel given by Han Vinck, and Chen. First note by [6], we
have the following equalities,
H(SKM |ZNM ) = H(SKM , ZNM )−H(ZNM ) (18)
=H(SKM , XNM , ZNM )
−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM )−H(ZNM ) (19)
=H(SKM , XNM |ZNM )
−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (20)
=H(XNM |ZNM )
−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (21)
=H(XNM |ZNM )−H(XNM |Y NM )
+H(XNM |Y NM )−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (22)
=I(XNM ;Y NM )− I(XNM |ZNM )
+H(XNM |Y NM )−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (23)
=NM [I(X ;Y )− I(X |Z)]
+H(XNM |Y NM )−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (24)
The same holds for ZˆNM , replacing ZNM as needed. Next we
substitute both equations into the difference of equivocation,
resulting in,
H(SKM |ZNM )−H(SKM |ZˆNM )
KM
=
NM [I(X ; Zˆ)− I(X |Z)]
KM
+
[H(XNM |SKM , ZˆNM )−H(XNM |SKM , ZNM )]
KM
Since conditioning reduces entropy, and XNM → ZˆNM →
ZNM is a Markov chain, it follows,
H(XNM |SKM , ZˆNM ) = H(XNM |SKM , ZNM , ZˆNM )) (25)
≤ H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) (26)
From [6], we have,
1) H(XNM |SKM , ZNM ) ≤ h(Pew) + Pew ∗KM,2
2) For any 0 < λ < 12 , we can choose NM large enough
so Pew ≤ λ
3) λ is dependent on NM , and limM→∞ λ = 0
Thus we can bound the magnitude of the difference of the
conditional entropies and take the limit,
0 ≤ lim
M→∞
[H(XNM |SKM , ZNM )−H(XNM |SKM , ZˆNM )]
KM
(27)
≤ lim
M→∞
2(h(Pew) + PewKM,2)
KM
(28)
≤ lim
M→∞
2(h(λ) + λKM,2)
KM
(29)
≤ lim
M→∞
2(h(λ) + λ(NM [1− h(p)− 2ǫM ] + 1))
NM (h(pW )− h(p)− ǫM ) (30)
= lim
M→∞
[
2h(λ)
NM (h(pW )− h(p)− ǫM )
]
+ lim
M→∞
[
2λ(NM [1− h(p)− 2ǫM ] + 1)
NM (h(pW )− h(p)− ǫM )
]
(31)
=0 (32)
The last equality follows since for the first term in the sum,
the numerator goes to 0, and the denominator grows. The
second term has λ → 0 , while the remainder converges to
a constant. To complete the proof since,
h(pW )− h(p) ≥ KM
NM
≥ h(pW )− h(p)− ǫM
Then,
lim
M→∞
KM
NM
= h(pW )− h(p)
Hence,
lim
M→∞
H(SKM |ZNM )−H(SKM |ZˆNM )
KM
(33)
= lim
M→∞
NM [I(X ; Zˆ)− I(X ;Z)]
KM
(34)
=
h(pW )− 1 + I(X ; Zˆ)
h(pW )− h(p) (35)
The equivocation loss theorem allows us to calculate the
loss in uncertainty of the eavesdropper due to using an A/D(L)
converter, when it is assumed by the legitimate users that the
eavesdropper is using an A/D(2) converter.
Lemma IV.2. (Approximation Lemma)
For any ǫ > 0, there exists a L > 0 and A/D(L) converter
such that
I(X ;W )− I(X ; Zˆ) < ǫ (36)
5Proof. Observe that this lemma follows from the general
definition of mutual information [7] pg. 252. Specifically,
let P and Q be finite partitions of the range of X and
W , respectively. The quantization of X and W by P and
Q (denoted [X ]P and [W ]Q) are discrete random variables
defined by
Pr([X ]P = i) = Pr(X ∈ Pi) =
∫
Pi
dF (x) (37)
Pr([W ]Q = i) = Pr(W ∈ Qi) =
∫
Qi
dF (w) (38)
Then by definition,
I(X ;W ) = sup
P,Q
I([X ]P ; [W ]Q) (39)
= sup
Q
I(X ; [W ]Q). (40)
Where the second equality follows trivially since |X | = 2.
Since X → W → [W ]QL is a Markov chain, , any
A/D(L) converter with associated partition QL will have
I(X ; [W ]QL) ≤ I(X ;W ). Thus given ǫ > 0, by definition
of sup, there exists a finite partition of the range of W , say
Q, such that
I(X ;W )− I(X ; [W ]Q) < ǫ.
Observe that [W ]Q is just Zˆ for a particular A/D(L) converter
where L = |Q|. In short, discretizing WN corresponds to an
adequately chosen A/D(L) converter, which is precisely ZˆN .
Note ZˆN and WN are referenced from Fig. 2, where we
use the notation ZˆN when L > 2. The dependence on L is
implicit in ZˆN .
Observe by the approximation lemma, it will suffice to
approximate the equivocation associated with the A/D(L) by
the equivocation given by direct access to the AWGN channel.
It is simpler to calculate I(X ;W ) instead of I(X ; Zˆ). Then
using the approximation lemma, we have,
Corollary IV.3. (Max Equivocation Loss)
lim
L→∞
h(pW )− 1 + I(X ; Zˆ)
h(pW )− h(p) =
h(pW )− 1 + I(X ;W )
h(pW )− h(p) (41)
Proof. This follows by direct application of the approximation
lemma to the equivocation loss theorem.
Now we are left with calculating I(X ;W ). First we shall
calculate the cdf of W .
P (W ≤ w) =P (X = −1)P (W ≤ w|X = −1) (42)
+ P (X = 1)P (W ≤ w|X = 1) (43)
=
1
2
[
Φ
(
w + 1√
σ2M + σ
2
W
)
+Φ
(
w − 1√
σ2M + σ
2
W
)]
(44)
Therefore taking the derivative,
fW (w) =
d
dw
P (W ≤ w) (45)
=
φ
(
w+1√
σ2
M
+σ2
W
)
+ φ
(
w−1√
σ2
M
+σ2
W
)
2
√
σ2M + σ
2
W
(46)
Then by the definition of mutual information,
I(X ;W ) = H(W )−H(W |X) (47)
=H(W )− P (X = −1)H(W |X = −1) (48)
− P (X = 1)H(W |X = 1) (49)
=H(W )− 1
2
log 2πe(σ2M + σ
2
W ) (50)
=−
∫ ∞
−∞
fW (w) log fW (w)dw − 1
2
log 2πe(σ2M + σ
2
W )
(51)
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We have calculated the mutual information, and can now use
corollary IV.3 to estimate the loss in equivocation. Looking at
(41) we see as the noise power in the wiretap channel grows,
that the equivocation loss goes to zero, which is illustrated
in Fig. 3. On the other hand, as the noise power in the
wiretap channel gets smaller, secrecy is lost. In particular, if
the σ2W = σ2M , approximately 0.5 bits of secrecy is lost per
bit transmitted. The equivocation is less than half of the value
for the case of a two level A/D converter. In this particular
instance, where the eavesdropper is allowed to use arbitrary
precision analog to digital converters, it is difficult to guarantee
a particular amount of secrecy.
The analysis presented here is for a simple model, and is
present only to illustrate the difficulty in making assump-
tions about the physical limitations in channel access of an
eavesdropper. In the analysis of more complicated scenarios,
especially in the wireless domain, incorrect assumptions on
the eavesdropper will present similar security losses. On the
other hand, this does not constitute a proof that physical layer
security using Wyner’s method is not possible.
V. USING SHARED KEYS TO INCREASE
SECURITY
In the previous section, we illustrated what happens if the
intended users believe that the eavesdropper uses an A/D(2)
6converter, but in reality the eavesdropper uses an A/D(L)
converter. While this is, in many regards, a toy example,
it illustrates that a wrong assumption (belief) on the eaves-
dropper’s channel leads to a compromised security system.
In other words, a system is information-theoretically secure
only if the assumptions (made by the intended users) of the
eavesdropper’s channel are correct. However, in practice, the
intended users do not control the eavesdropper’s channel nor
behavior. Hence the intended users can never verify their
assumptions.
In a practical setting, apart from using a better A/D con-
verter, the eavesdropper can; 1) use multiple antennas, 2)
decrease the distance to the transmitter, 3) use non-AWGN
channels, etc... If the intended users make the wrong guess
regarding any of these parameters, they will not achieve a
secure system.
Thus making assumptions about the wiretapper’s capabili-
ties is difficult. One potential alternative is to combine some of
the techniques of modern cryptography with Wyner’s secrecy
coding techniques. We will artificially create random channels,
and then use the corresponding stochastic encoding to secure
the message. Our assumption will be, as in contemporary
cryptography, that recovering the preshared key used to create
the channel is computationally intractable.
We remove the dependence on a true source of randomness.
In particular, the stochastic encoder is dependent on a source
of true randomness. Our solution will be to use general
purpose pseudorandom number generators as input to the
stochastic encoder and input to create artificial channels. By
pseudorandom number generation, we follow the guideline of
Goldreich [9],
”Loosely speaking, general-purpose pseudorandom generators
are efficient deterministic programs that expand short ran-
domly selected seeds into longer pseudorandom bit sequences,
where the latter are defined as computationally indistinguish-
able from truly random sequences by any efficient algorithm.”
A. General Solution Strategy
Our general solution strategy is to simulate the main and
wiretap channels in the Wyner wiretap channel model at the
transmitter prior to transmission, see Fig. 4. The resulting data
is then transmitted over a physical channel with channel coding
such that it is assumed the eavesdropper and intended users
have perfect copies of the sent data. When we simulate the
wiretap channel, it is done in such a way that the intended
receiver with knowledge of a preshared key can reverse the
simulation. In addition, at no point do we assume a true source
of randomness.
The first step in designing our system, is to choose the
preferred channel types for the main and wiretap channel,
where the wiretap channel is stochastically degraded with
respect to the main channel. We choose an encoding scheme
that will achieve information theoretic security based on the
assumption that the real channel model was implemented. Up
to this point, we are exactly in the framework of Wyner’s
paper. This is where we take a separate path. We use pseudo-
random number generation as the source of randomness for
the stochastic encoding, and to artificially create the main
channel. The pseudorandom noise generators are initialized
with a randomly selected seed that only the sender knows.
In order to emulate the wiretap channel, we use a general
purpose pseudorandom number generator that is seeded with
a preshared key. For the wiretap channel we require that given
the preshared key, the intended receiver must be able to reverse
the process of emulating the wiretap channel.
In this model the intended receiver is knowledgeable of the
shared key for the wiretap noise, and can remove this noise
exactly. The pseudorandom noise used to emulate the main
channel, can not be removed, and the intended user decodes
using the error correcting code. At this point the intended user
has recovered the source message.
On the other hand, the eavesdropper is knowledgable of
the complete design of the system, with the exception of the
preshared key. The eavesdropper’s attacks will then be based
on exploiting the weakness of the pseudorandom number
generation to recover the secret key, and seeds.
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Fig. 4. General Model for Wyner based coding using computational in-
tractability
B. Example
We provide an example that follows the approach of Mi-
haljevic [3] in system design. In particular, we assume the
following notation:
a = [ai]
l
i=1 : plaintext
r = [ri]
m−l
i=1 : Bernoulli(1/2)i.i.d. random variables
u = [ui]
k
i=1 : public Bernoulli(1/2)i.i.d. random variables
S = [si,j ]
k n
i=1 j=1 : binary(k × n)secret key matrix
v = [vi]
n
i=1 : unknown Bernoulli(p)i.i.d. random variables
M : invertible mixing matrix (m×m)
fE : stochastic encoder from{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
g : decoder
Then encryption and decryption are as follows. The cipher-
text, z, is calculated as
z = fE(M · (a ‖ r))⊕ u · S⊕ v (52)
where ‖ denotes concatenation. Let trunc(x, l), be the trun-
cation function which returns the first l bits of x. Decryption
of the ciphertext, is shown below,
a = trunc
(
M
−1 · g(z⊕ u · S), l) (53)
There are three main parts in the design of this system. In
particular, we first use concatenation of a random vector and
a mixing matrix to increase the entropy of the input to the
7encoding. This helps protect against known plaintext attacks.
Then we create a main channel that is a BSC(p), and we
employ a stochastic encoding to correct for the corresponding
errors. Finally we use a secret key matrix, and public random
vector to create a ”noisier” channel for the eavesdropper. The
new system is in Fig. 5. From an information theoretic point of
view, since the error correction will compensate for the added
randomness, this system is not secure, as the eavesdroppers
channel is deterministic. From here we take the viewpoint of
conventional cryptography, that solving for the secret key is
computationally intractable. In particular, this is an instance
of the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem, which is
provably NP-hard. Furthermore the LPN problem is a natural
choice for stochastic encoding techniques. This follows since
solving for the secret key, S, is equivalent to decoding a
random linear block code [10].
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Fig. 5. Learning Parity with Noise Based Cryptoystem
Thus we are combining a computationally hard problem
with an information theoretic based security method. We have
now made a trade off on assumptions about the eavesdropper’s
channel, to one on the ability to solve a computationally
hard problem. The latter is widely accepted in conventional
cryptography.
C. Implementation Issues
A motivation for this paper, was to create a lightweight
cryptographic system based on concepts from physical layer
security. Two potential issues that will increase the complexity
of using this system are; 1) the creation of satisfactory and
cryptographically secure random variables, and 2) proper
choice of coding parameters.
Creation of cryptographically secure pseudo-random num-
bers is a difficult problem, and in this security system they are
directly applied to plaintext. This leaves an opening for attacks
on the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). Further-
more a source of public randomness is assumed. This leaves
the system open to man in the middle attacks. Thus we must
include measures to guarantee availability and authenticity of
the public random vector.
In addition, we must choose adequate coding parameters for
the length of the r vector, and the stochastic encoder, fE . A
thorough analysis should be performed to find a characteri-
zation of the eavesdropper’s channel with regards to Wyner’s
wiretap model. In particular, assuming the randomness in v
is cryptographically secure, we say the main channel is a
BSC(p) channel. Then we may find a 0 < pW < 12 as
large as possible and base the construction of fE on the
assumption that the eavesdropper’s channel is a BSC(pW ).
Observe choosing pW large, increases the rate of our stochastic
encoder, which reduces the security of our system. Thus
we must find an upper limit for pW such that the resulting
parameters for r and fE ensure it is computationally infeasible
for the eavesdropper to recover the secret key.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, one of the concerns in basing a security
system on assumptions about the eavesdropping capabilities
of an unintended user has been adressed. An alternative has
been presented which uses one of the main principles of
Wyner’s paper, security through stochastic encoding. It is a
convenient solution, in the sense that it does not require any
changes in infrastructure. In particular, it can be added on at
the application layer. It is noted, that this is a toy example,
and used to illustrate a point.
A valid counter argument to the solution proposed in this
paper, is that there is still an assumption made on the eaves-
dropper’s capabilities in using this method. The onus has been
transferred from relying on physically acquiring the signal
to computational limitations. In regard to this argument, this
paper than serves two purpose. First, it shows that care must
be taken in assumptions about the eavesdropper. In addition,
for a simple case it illustrates how to calculate the effect of
incorrect assumptions, and engineer a system within certain
secrecy tolerances.
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